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Debates over climate action, West 
Papua, fisheries, and trade contin-
ued as a feature of regional affairs in 
2016, often dividing Pacific govern-
ments and their international partners. 
The election of Donald Trump as US 
president in November set the stage 
for these divisions to continue, given 
Trump’s statements during the elec-
tion  campaign on climate change and 
America’s new directions in foreign 
policy. 
Other global events during the 
year—including the Brexit referendum 
in June, international movement of 
refugees and economic slowdown in 
China, Russia, and India—will have 
significant regional implications. 
Even as vibrant Pacific diplomacy 
saw advances on climate, oceans, and 
fisheries policy, the new era of interna-
tional uncertainty creates problems for 
Small Island Developing States (sids). 
Leadership changes in the United 
States and Europe are transform-
ing relations between allies, creating 
clashes between European Union (EU) 
partners and sowing doubt about 
international treaty commitments on 
trade, climate, development fund-
ing, and security. That’s bad news 
for smaller developing nations, as the 
proverb suggests: “When the elephants 
fight, it is the grass that suffers.”
Although regional organizations 
found it hard to forge consensus on 
divisive issues, island nations still 
advanced the regional agenda in the 
United Nations. Countries like Fiji are 
increasingly striking their own path 
and seeking new alliances, which in 
turn bring complex international con-
flicts into regional organizations. One 
example during 2016 was the debate 
over self-determination in West Papua, 
which has brought divisions to both 
the Pacific Islands Forum (pif) and 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (msg) 
that consensus communiqués cannot 
paper over.
Beyond the human and economic 
cost, climate change and natural disas-
ters are also contributing to broader 
strategic changes in the region. After 
Cyclone Winston in Fiji, Australia 
and New Zealand deployed warships 
and helicopters for post-cyclone relief, 
China and India provided fund-
ing, and Indonesian soldiers rebuilt 
schools, highlighting how environment 
issues are interconnected with wider 
geopolitical shifts.
Throughout the year, governments, 
regional organizations, and nongov-
ernmental organizations addressed 
the diverse economic, environmental, 
and social impacts of climate change 
with research studies on agriculture 
and forestry (spc 2016), coastal and 
oceanic fisheries (Fache and Pauwels 
2016), natural disasters (World Bank 
2016), and climate finance (Maclellan 
and Meads 2016). A United Nations 
Environment Program report in May 
estimated that the cost of adapting to 
climate change in developing coun-
tries could rise to between us$280 
billion and us$500 billion per year 
by 2050, a figure that is four to five 
times greater than previous estimates 
(unep 2016, xii, 42).
As with Cyclone Pam in 2014, 
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Cyclone Winston in 2016 brought 
home the importance of disaster 
preparedness. Overnight on 19–20 
February, the category five cyclone hit 
Fiji’s northern Lau Islands after caus-
ing extensive flooding in Tuvalu and 
other neighbors. While Fiji’s capital 
was largely spared the worst effects, 
there was significant damage in the 
north and west of the country.
In May, the Fiji government issued 
an official post-disaster needs assess-
ment (Government of Fiji 2016). 
Nearly forty thousand people required 
immediate assistance following the 
cyclone, with 30,369 houses, 495 
schools, and eighty-eight health 
clinics and medical facilities dam-
aged or destroyed. In addition, the 
cyclone destroyed crops on a large 
scale, including economically vital 
sugarcane. Causing nearly f$2 billion 
in damage, this one disaster com-
promised the livelihoods of nearly 
540,400 people (62 percent of Fiji’s 
population).
At every possible opportunity dur-
ing 2016, Pacific leaders stressed that 
industrialized nations need to move 
beyond the targets set by the 2015 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. 
Republic of the Marshall Islands 
(RMI) President Hilda Heine told 
the UN General Assembly (unga) in 
September: “We need to do more to 
increase ambition, on mitigation, on 
adaptation and on finance. We must 
take every opportunity we can to stay 
below [the] 1.5 degree limit needed for 
our survival” (Heine 2016).
For years, Pacific governments 
have been urging donors to reduce 
the many barriers that limit access to 
financial resources to respond to cli-
mate change. This message was echoed 
by Oxfam Pacific as it launched new 
research on “climate finance after 
Paris,” highlighting the need for pre-
dictability, coordination, access, and 
adequacy of funding (Maclellan and 
Meads 2016).
In September, Nauru’s President 
Baron Waqa highlighted ongoing 
funding problems for small island 
states: “Some international funding 
mechanisms exclude small countries 
like mine, or prove impossible to 
access because of our limited  capacity. 
Private investment is unreliable, and 
rarely available to support basic 
 services and critical infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, the most promising 
financing models for small developing 
countries, like direct access and direct 
budgetary support, are rarely available 
as an option. This needs to change, 
so that small countries fully benefit 
from the historic agreements we have 
reached” (Waqa 2016).
In one positive response, the new 
Green Climate Fund (gcf) held its 
board meeting in Apia in December. 
Sāmoa’s UN ambassador, Aliioaiga 
Feturi Elisaia, who represents Small 
Island Developing States on the board, 
said the meeting was “to provide gcf 
Board members with an opportunity 
to see and experience first-hand the 
realities that the Pacific region and 
island communities are already facing 
on a daily basis” (Elisaia 2016).
The gcf Board approved nearly 
us$98 million for three projects in 
the Pacific, but the United States and 
France also blocked a push by devel-
oping countries to increase finance for 
the gcf’s Readiness and Preparatory 
Support program. Pacific representa-
tives joined other Small Island Devel-
oping States to call for an increase 
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from us$15 million to us$100 million 
annually for this program, which helps 
with the costs of feasibility studies and 
preparing gcf applications. However, 
the gcf Board only allocated half that 
amount (Maclellan 2017).
Encouraged by the decision of the 
Obama administration to sign the 
Paris Agreement and contribute to the 
gcf, Pacific leaders watched the US 
presidential election with a wary eye. 
During the 2016 electoral campaign, 
Republican candidate Donald Trump 
pledged to “cancel the Paris Climate 
Agreement” and “stop all payments of 
US tax dollars to UN global warming 
programs.” Despite later denials and 
evasions, Trump has made statements 
describing climate change as a “hoax” 
and suggesting that “the concept of 
global warming was created by and 
for the Chinese in order to make US 
manufacturing non-competitive” 
(Schulman 2016).
As the news that Donald Trump 
had won the US elections reached the 
November UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (unfccc) 
Conference of the Parties (cop22) in 
Morocco, Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe 
Bainimarama seized the moment for 
a gesture that captured worldwide 
media attention, inviting Trump to 
visit Fiji to see the damage of cyclone 
Winston: “I want to make a special 
appeal to the President-Elect of the 
United States, Donald Trump, for a 
personal change of heart and pub-
lic change of policy on the issue of 
climate change. . . . I am especially 
alarmed by reports that you intend 
to withdraw from the Paris Agree-
ment, which would be disastrous for 
every person on earth” (Bainimarama 
2016).
Over time, changes to US policy 
on climate and development aid will 
flow through to regional institu-
tions. In November, Director Gen-
eral of the Pacific Community (spc) 
Colin Tukuitonga stated: “I think it’s 
important to point out that the USA 
is a founding member of spc and has 
been with us since 1947 and we expect 
to continue the good work that has 
been done with the support of the US 
government both in climate change 
and other areas” (rnzi 2016a).
Coming to office in January 2017, 
the new US president made other 
decisions that raised uncertainty about 
US commitments in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Trump used executive orders 
to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (tppa), a 
 central pillar of the Obama admin-
istration’s “Pacific pivot.” Other 
illiberal actions by the Trump admin-
istration—on refugees, disdain for 
journalists, and judicial review of 
executive action—will give encourage-
ment to more authoritarian elements 
in the region.
Changes within the European 
Union have also forced Pacific Island 
countries to maneuver, transforming 
long-standing partnerships.
Anglophone members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum have long relied on 
the United Kingdom to support their 
engagement with the European Union 
through British subsidies for sugar or 
Commonwealth Foundation support 
for civil society initiatives. Pacific 
leaders have valued the Common-
wealth Heads of Government Meet-
ing (chogm) as an opportunity for 
face-to-face interaction with African 
Least Developed Countries and Carib-
bean Small Island Developing States 
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(csids)—crucial partners during 
global climate negotiations.
The June 2016 Brexit referendum 
on UK membership in the European 
Union has created new uncertainty 
about Britain’s contribution to the 
European Development Fund (edf). 
Sensing this change, Forum countries 
have begun to reposition themselves 
with other European powers: at the 
pif leaders meeting in Pohnpei in 
 September, leaders granted Germany 
the status of Post-Forum Dialogue 
Partner (the German development 
agency giz already has an active 
role in Pacific  climate adaptation 
and, in coming years, Germany may 
play a supportive role in interna-
tional debates about financing for 
 development).
The biggest change, however, 
comes with the Forum’s transformed 
relationship with France. In a single 
sentence, item 30 of the Forum com-
muniqué from Pohnpei stated: “Lead-
ers accepted French Polynesia and 
New Caledonia as full members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum” (pifs 2016b, 
5). Both French dependencies gained 
Forum associate membership in 2006, 
but this new decision makes them full 
participants, ending the Forum as a 
body of independent and sovereign 
nations. President of New Caledonia 
Philippe Germain and French Poly-
nesian President Édouard Fritch both 
welcomed the opportunity to give 
their territory a greater role in the 
Forum. 
The decision, however, surprised 
many regional observers, as Forum 
leaders could not publicly explain 
what criteria were used to change the 
pif membership rules. The decision 
was also taken despite calls by leading 
Kanak and Maohi independence activ-
ists to defer a decision on membership 
(Maclellan 2016c, 2016f). In Pohnpei, 
Sāmoa Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele 
Malielegaoi acknowledged that it 
was “a political decision” (Maclellan 
2016e). 
Under outgoing French President 
François Hollande, France has been 
an active partner on climate change, 
development programs, and EU rela-
tions. As a major contributor to the 
Green Climate Fund, Paris has also 
increased its bilateral climate pro-
grams in Pacific Island states. But the 
national interests of individual Forum 
member states had an impact on the 
regional decision to support the two 
territories’ full membership. 
Australia has been building closer 
security ties with France, with Prime 
Minister Malcolm Turnbull announc-
ing in April that the French shipbuild-
ing corporation dcns had won a 
contract for a$50 billion to build the 
next generation of submarines for the 
Royal Australian Navy. The New Zea-
land government led by John Key was 
also a vocal supporter of the Forum 
membership change after a visit by 
French Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
in May (the first visit to Wellington 
by a French leader since 1991). The 
state visit to France by Papua New 
Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill 
in June was a first for a PNG leader, 
with O’Neill meeting French energy 
corporation Total to discuss expanded 
investment in Papua New Guinea’s oil 
and liquid natural gas (lng) industry 
(Maclellan 2016b).
The charm offensive from Paris 
may change, however, after the French 
presidential (April/May 2017) and 
legislative elections (June 2017). 
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 Hollande, the unpopular leader of the 
French Socialist Party, announced in 
December that he would not run for a 
second term, opening the way for the 
election of a conservative government 
(some observers are fearful of a strong 
showing by Marine Le Pen, the char-
ismatic leader of the extreme Right 
Front National). With the French 
state retaining control of key powers 
over defense, security, and currency, 
the Forum Secretariat may now find 
that conservative leaders in Paris will 
try to override island-focused policies 
advanced by Noumea and Papeete 
within the regional organization. 
As a midsize global power, the 
French state has its own strategic 
interests in the region, including 7 
million square kilometers of Exclusive 
Economic Zone surrounding its Pacific 
dependencies. During a flying visit to 
Tahiti in February, President Hollande 
reaffirmed his country’s intention to 
remain a power in the region. “That’s 
another reason for my visit here,” he 
told the Assembly of French Polyne-
sia, “to show that there are no far-off 
territories of the French Republic—
there is only the Republic. . . . You are 
not far from France, because you are 
France, because I am here in France” 
(Hollande 2016).
The Forum expansion is part of a 
long-standing plan to better integrate 
the US, French, and New Zealand 
non-self-governing territories into 
regional institutions. Sāmoa Prime 
Minister Tuilaepa has encouraged 
American Sāmoa to seek full Forum 
membership when he hosts the next 
leaders’ meeting in Apia in 2017. In 
contrast, the Ulu o Tokelau (titular 
head of government), Aliki Faipule 
Afega Gaualofa, said his country is 
not yet ready to seek full member-
ship: “This is a matter that is under 
consideration, but I do not see the 
need any time soon for Tokelau to 
be a full member. We want to focus 
on progressing issues for institutional 
strengthening before we can consider 
membership and the responsibilities 
that come with it” (rnzi 2016b).
Tuna politics dominated regional 
economic activity throughout the year, 
with the signing of key treaties and 
the transition to a new chief executive, 
Ludwig Kumoru, at the helm of the 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (pna). 
In February, the long-running 
renegotiation of the 1988 US–South 
Pacific Multilateral Treaty on Fisher-
ies collapsed when the US govern-
ment formally notified its intention 
to withdraw from the treaty. The 
Pacific didn’t blink. After further 
talks in June, a new deal was struck, 
with Forum Fisheries Agency (ffa) 
Director-General James Movick 
 stating: “The Pacific should be incred-
ibly pleased with the outcome of the 
session. . . . We have struck a six 
year deal that should provide for a 
secure yet flexible future for the US 
industry, stability in the delivery of 
US economic assistance and excellent 
financial returns to the Pacific islands” 
(ffa 2016).
The revised seven-year treaty, 
signed in December, gives regional 
access to the US purse-seiner fleet, 
with an industry payment of us$45 
million per annum, government fisher-
ies aid of us$21 million, and other 
positive features.
Meanwhile, at the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
Island countries resisted proposals 
that would have weakened the vessel 
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day scheme (vds), a crucial element 
of fisheries management that has 
seen pna licensing revenues increase 
from us$64 million in 2010 to nearly 
us$400 million today. In July, outgo-
ing pna ceo Transform Aqorau criti-
cized Asian Development Bank (adb) 
proposals for reform of the vessel 
day scheme: “The harsh truth for the 
adb and other major regional donors 
is that the vds—probably the most 
successful single development instru-
ment in the region—succeeds in part 
because the donors, and the major 
regional organizations that they sup-
port, are excluded and are not directly 
involved” (pna 2016).
To cap off a positive year for fisher-
ies, a unga resolution in December 
endorsed a pna initiative to establish 
2 May as World Tuna Day. With the 
first of three UN Oceans conferences 
scheduled for June 2017, Pacific 
diplomacy will continue to highlight 
sustainability of fisheries and the 
ocean environment.
Apart from climate and oceans 
policy, the Smaller Island States (sis) 
are less engaged in international geo-
politics than larger Forum members. 
Even so, the sis group met in Palau 
in June to adopt a new strategy that 
recognizes their particular needs on 
climate change, mobility, health, the 
marine environment, and air and sea 
transportation. At the Pohnpei Forum 
in September, host nation Federated 
States of Micronesia formally joined 
the sis, although Niue’s Premier 
Toke Talagi boycotted the pre-Forum 
meeting. (After forty-two years of 
free association with New Zealand, 
Talagi wants Niue to join the United 
Nations, an ambitious agenda for an 
island nation with just 1,200 people.)
The Council of Regional Orga-
nizations in the Pacific (crop) also 
met with UN agencies based in the 
region, as they develop a United 
Nations Pacific Strategy (unps) for 
2018–2022. 
For the first time, the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum (pidf) sum-
mit was held outside Fiji. The July 
meeting in Honiara had the theme 
“Stewardship for Healthy Oceans 
and Healthy Nations,” with diverse 
representation from China, the United 
States, Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Pitcairn, and Wallis and Futuna. At 
the meeting, Timor-Leste formally 
joined existing pidf members Fiji, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Nauru, Solo-
mon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, 
Tokelau, the Pacific Island Associa-
tion of Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions (piango), and the Pacific Island 
Private Sector Organisation (pipso). 
Papua New Guinea and Sāmoa have 
thus far refused to join pidf.
Under Prime Minister Bainima-
rama, Fiji has used pidf to mount suc-
cessful diplomatic interventions on the 
international stage, such as the 2015 
Suva Declaration on Climate Change. 
At the same time, Fiji’s regional 
relations—with Papua New Guinea, 
Australia, and the Forum Secretariat—
have continued along a bumpy path. 
Fiji-Forum relations may continue to 
be unsettled, given that Sāmoa Prime 
Minister Tuilaepa—a frequent critic of 
his Fijian counterpart—will host the 
2017 Forum meeting. 
Despite this, Fiji’s international 
profile reached new heights in 2016 
when its permanent representative 
to the United Nations, Peter Thom-
son, was elected president of the UN 
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General Assembly for 2016–17. As he 
took up the seat in October, it was the 
first time a Pacific Island country had 
been chosen to lead the world body. 
Thomson is a descendant of an old 
colonial family in Fiji, with “kava in 
the blood” (Thomson 1999). Since he 
took up the post as Fiji’s UN ambas-
sador in 2010, Thomson has become a 
central player in expanding the inter-
national profile of both Fiji and the 
wider Pacific Small Island Developing 
States (psids) grouping.
Thomson was unga vice president 
in 2011–2012, and in 2013 he chaired 
the Group of 77 (g-77) and China 
(the UN’s largest negotiating bloc 
of developing nations). He served as 
president of the Assembly of the Inter-
national Seabed Authority (isa) in 
2011–2012 and was the president of 
the isa Council in 2015–2016. These 
stepping-stones led to his nomination 
for the unga presidency, as the repre-
sentative of the UN group of Asia and 
psids (a bloc that links Island states to 
the emerging Asian powerhouses but 
excludes Australia and New Zealand).
The yearlong unga presidency will 
allow Fiji and other psids to advance 
their regional agenda on climate 
change, oceans, and nuclear security. 
In June 2017, Fiji will cohost with 
Sweden the United Nations Confer-
ence on Oceans and Seas, the first of 
three international gatherings over the 
next fifteen years. In a major coup, Fiji 
was also chosen as cochair of the next 
unfccc cop23 in November 2017 
(with the venue in Bonn rather than 
Suva).
University of the South Pacific 
academic Sandra Tarte noted that 
Bainimarama’s Fiji First Party has 
used these international achievements 
to consolidate its standing in domes-
tic politics: “Bainimarama was also 
able to bask in the reflected glory of 
the country’s first ever Olympic gold 
medal win—when its men’s rugby 
 sevens team claimed victory in Rio. 
Bainimarama extolled the virtues of 
team discipline and unity—hallmarks 
of his government’s approach to 
nation building. But the corollary to 
this is a political space increasingly 
controlled and dominated by the 
government, with alternative politi-
cal parties relegated to the margins” 
(Tarte 2016).
Fiji will also mount a campaign to 
win a seat on the UN Human Rights 
Council in 2018, again unprecedented 
for an Island nation. Fiji’s interna-
tional reputation should guarantee 
this seat, despite domestic concerns 
about the 2016 detention of opposi-
tion members of Parliament and trade 
unionists, ongoing violence by police 
and corrections officers against prison-
ers, and other restrictions on public 
engagement and the media.
Even as Fijian diplomats carried 
the regional agenda into international 
institutions, the government’s regional 
relations had tense moments during 
2016. 
Bainimarama continued his dance 
with Australia and New Zealand, 
 welcoming their support for post-
cyclone reconstruction and hosting 
John Key in Suva in June (the first 
visit by a New Zealand Prime Minister 
since the 2006 coup). Bainimarama 
met with Australian Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull on the margins of 
the UN General Assembly in Septem-
ber and made a state visit to New Zea-
land in October, but he also engaged 
in sharp disputes with Key over the 
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New Zealand prime minister’s criti-
cism of the detention of Fijian opposi-
tion leaders.
Bainimarama did not attend the 
annual Forum leaders’ meeting in 
Pohnpei. Indeed, he announced a 
cabinet reshuffle in the middle of the 
meeting, taking the position of foreign 
minister from Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, 
who was representing Fiji at the 
Forum. Kubuabola, now defense 
minister, was only informed of his new 
role in a message sent days after the 
Forum had begun (Maclellan 2016a). 
During the year, Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea entered into a war of 
words over inter-Melanesian trade 
policy. The two largest island econo-
mies also resisted a push by Australia 
and New Zealand to complete Pacific 
Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (pacer)–Plus negotiations 
by year’s end, despite Forum leaders 
agreeing in Pohnpei to finalize the 
regional trade agreement. 
Forum trade negotiators have 
agreed on much of the legal text for 
pacer-Plus, but in August, PNG Trade 
Minister Richard Maru withdrew 
from the process, announcing: “I’ve 
made it clear that PNG is not inter-
ested and that I have directed all my 
officers not to entertain any negotia-
tions” (Kisselpar 2016). By year’s end, 
Fiji Trade Minister Faiyaz Koya said 
his country also continued to maintain 
reservations about the text, seeking 
further negotiation on Infant Indus-
try Development and Most Favored 
Nation status (Maclellan 2016d, 20). 
Community groups were criti-
cal of the lack of systematic social 
impact studies for pacer-Plus, with 
the Pacific Network on Globalization 
arguing that the “pacer-Plus [trade 
agreement] is the latest in a long line 
of attempts by [Australia and New 
Zealand] to shape the Pacific Islands 
in their interests; this time though they 
will be able to do so with legally bind-
ing and enforceable commitments” 
(pang 2016, 4). 
In the aftermath of Cyclone Win-
ston, Fiji received extensive cyclone 
relief from the Australian and New 
Zealand defense forces, with the 
deployment of hmas Canberra, 
hmnzs Canterbury, and hmnzs 
 Wellington, as well as rnzaf and 
raaf helicopters and p3 Orion aircraft 
to assist relief operations in the outer 
islands. Many grassroots Fijians and 
commentators noted that Australia 
and New Zealand were quicker to 
respond than other “nontraditional” 
partners: “Cyclone Winston provided 
Australia and New Zealand with 
the opportunity to demonstrate their 
commitment to Fiji, irrespective of 
their political differences. It was also 
a timely reminder that geography and 
proximity do matter” (Powles and 
Sousa-Santos 2016, 7).
Despite these deployments, how-
ever, the strategic implications of 
global warming in Oceania are poorly 
covered in two Defence White Papers 
issued by Australia in February and 
New Zealand in June. Former Chief 
of the Australian Defence Force 
Admiral Chris Barrie has argued that 
“Australia continues to lag behind its 
military allies, taking comparatively 
little action on climate change and 
only fleetingly acknowledging climate 
change in public documents like Aus-
tralia’s Defence White Paper” (Barrie 
and Steffen 2015, 1).
Fiji used the post-cyclone period to 
strengthen ties with China, Indonesia, 
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and other partners. In Beijing in April, 
then Foreign Minister Kubuabola 
met with his Chinese counterpart 
Wang Yi to seek further economic 
support  (Foreign Affairs 2016). After 
President Xi Jinping’s November 2014 
state visit to Fiji and a return visit to 
China in July 2015 by Prime Minister 
 Bainimarama, the two countries are 
working on a range of development 
agreements, including a feasibil-
ity study to create a China-Fiji Free 
Trade Agreement.
Seeking greater international sup-
port for infrastructure projects in the 
aftermath of recent disasters, Fiji is 
lobbying to obtain full membership in 
the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (aiib), which began 
operations in January with fifty-seven 
founding members. The Fiji Develop-
ment Bank is also seeking accredita-
tion as a national entity with the 
Green Climate Fund, headquartered 
in Songdo, Korea.
China also used regional institu-
tions to extend its support to other 
Pacific nations. Forum Secretary Gen-
eral Dame Meg Taylor stated: “During 
the past year we’ve had a number of 
high level visits from China and that, 
I think, sends a very strong signal to 
the region that China is very interested 
in our development and what we are 
trying to do” (pifs 2016a). Beijing 
agreed to double the number of schol-
arships under the China-pifs Regional 
Scholarship Scheme and contributed 
more than us$1 million to the China–
Pacific Island Forum Cooperative 
Fund.
On the fortieth anniversary of 
diplomatic relations between Papua 
New Guinea and the People’s Repub-
lic, PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill 
visited China in July, meeting with 
Premier Li Keqiang and President 
Xi Jinping. During the visit, O’Neill 
signed seven agreements on develop-
ment cooperation, civil aviation, and 
a feasibility study for a free-trade 
agreement between the two countries, 
as well as three framework deals on 
concessional loans for infrastructure. 
As with Western donors, this 
Chinese support comes with strings. 
Following an International Court of 
Justice ruling in favor of the Philip-
pines over maritime boundaries in the 
South China Sea, Papua New Guinea 
reiterated its support for the “one 
China” policy and China’s position 
on the maritime dispute. In contrast, 
analysts in Beijing and Western capi-
tals were surprised when Fiji called on 
all parties to adhere to international 
law (though this should hardly be a 
surprise, given Fiji’s historic role in 
negotiating the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and establishing the 
International Seabed Authority).
Global diplomacy by Canberra, 
Suva, and Port Moresby is built on 
good relations with Jakarta, given 
Indonesia’s central role in the Non-
Aligned Movement, g-77, and UN 
Asia-Pacific bloc. This has compli-
cated regional policy making in both 
the Forum and Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (msg). 
In early 2016, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Retno Marsudi visited Mela-
nesian countries to reiterate Jakarta’s 
opposition to any support for the 
West Papuan nationalist movement. 
In April, Papua New Guinea signed 
eleven memoranda of understanding 
with Indonesia on economic coopera-
tion and political relations. Improved 
relations between Fiji and Indonesia 
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were also symbolized by the deploy-
ment of one hundred Indonesian 
armed forces (tni) soldiers to rebuild 
the elite Queen Victoria School, badly 
damaged during Cyclone Winston 
(Jakarta Post 2016). This cooperation 
has spurred dialogue on a possible 
Fiji-Indonesia Defense Cooperation 
agreement, discussed by Defense Min-
ister Kubuabola and tni chief General 
Gatot Nurmantyo in November.
The ongoing bid for msg mem-
bership on the part of the United 
Liberation Movement of West Papua 
(ulmwp)—fiercely opposed by 
Jakarta—has divided the subregional 
organization, pitting the two largest 
members against Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, and the Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (flnks).
After a Special msg Leaders’ Sum-
mit in July deferred consideration 
of the ulmwp bid, Vanuatu Deputy 
Prime Minister Joe Natuman stated: 
“It appears other people are trying to 
use the msg to drive their own agen-
das and I am sorry but I will insist that 
msg is being bought by others. It is 
just like Jesus Christ who was bought 
for 30 pieces of silver. . . . If our 
friends in Fiji and Papua New Guinea 
have a different agenda, we need to 
sit down and talk very seriously about 
what is happening within the organi-
zation” (McGarry 2016).
Throughout 2016, Pacific civil soci-
ety continued to mobilize in solidarity 
with West Papua. A range of groups 
raised the issue through the Frame-
work for Pacific Regionalism (fpr), 
the new policy mechanism created to 
put forward submissions for regional 
action by Forum leaders. In both 
2015 and 2016, the largest number 
of submissions through the fpr called 
for action on West Papua, causing 
anxiety among some members of the 
Forum Officials Committee. (In 2017, 
the Forum will not call for new fpr 
submissions before the next leaders 
meeting in Sāmoa.)
Extensive public debate over West 
Papua angered Indonesian diplomats 
and complicated life for Pacific gov-
ernments. Most Forum members are 
willing to talk about human rights but 
reluctant to publicly acknowledge the 
right to self-determination. In con-
trast, msg chair and Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare 
argued: “Human rights violations 
in West Papua and the pursuit for 
self-determination of West Papua are 
two sides of the same coin” (Sogavare 
2016).
To strengthen its support of the 
West Papuan nationalist movement, 
the Solomon Islands government 
appointed former diplomat Rex Horoi 
as the country’s special envoy on West 
Papua. Sogavare toured other msg 
countries in late 2016, trying unsuc-
cessfully to forge a new consensus in 
support of msg membership for the 
ulmwp. 
Within the wider Forum, Australia, 
Papua New Guinea, and Fiji contin-
ued to back Indonesia’s sovereignty 
over West Papua (Macleod, Moiwend, 
and Pilbrow 2016). At the 2016 
Forum meeting in Pohnpei, leaders 
could not agree on strong action, with 
the final communiqué simply stating 
that “leaders recognized the politi-
cal sensitivities of the issue of West 
Papua (Papua) and agreed the issue 
of alleged human rights violations in 
West Papua should remain on their 
agenda. Leaders also agreed on the 
importance of an open and construc-
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tive dialogue with Indonesia on the 
issue” (pifs 2016a).
piango Executive Director Emele 
Duituturaga said: “We also know 
that the draft text reflected their 
intention to take West Papua to the 
UN but when the final communiqué 
was released, it had been watered 
down. . . . We know that a couple 
of members had hoped the issue of 
West Papua would be removed alto-
gether. . . . It is obvious that geo poli-
tics were at play which brings to ques-
tion whether in fact our leaders can be 
bold and courageous in the presence 
of neighbouring powers like Australia 
and New Zealand” (piango 2016).
Even so, Forum Secretary General 
Dame Meg Taylor acknowledged the 
issue must continue to be debated: 
“It’s an issue that needs to be pursued 
and it’s not going to go away. Our big-
ger countries in the region like Austra-
lia and New Zealand realise that this 
issue is just not going to go to sleep—
and it shouldn’t go to sleep, because 
it is very important for our region” 
(Maclellan 2016g).
With the msg and pif paralyzed 
on West Papua, individual countries 
worked through the Pacific Coalition 
on West Papua (pcwp) to lobby at the 
United Nations. Just weeks after the 
Forum, seven governments individu-
ally raised the question during their 
annual intervention at the UN General 
Assembly. It was noticeable that long-
standing West Papua supporters like 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were 
joined by Micronesian and Polynesian 
nations: Nauru, Marshall Islands, 
Palau, Tonga, and Tuvalu. 
Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga told UN 
members: “The principle of self-
determination must be respected and 
honoured. The violation of human 
rights in West Papua and their desire 
to achieve self-determination is a real-
ity. This great body cannot and must 
not ignore these deplorable situations, 
it must not hide behind the guise of 
the principles of non-interference and 
sovereignty” (Sopoaga 2016).
Indonesia reacted angrily. Visiting 
Australia in November, Defense Min-
ister Ryamizard Ryacudu told Austra-
lia to “please tell Solomon Island and 
those six nations (from the msg) never 
to interfere or encourage West Papua 
to join them. Those countries better 
keep their mouths shut and mind their 
own business. It is better that (Aus-
tralia) speaks to them gently. If it was 
left up to me, I would twist their ears” 
(Hodge and Rayda 2016). 
The region needs more courageous 
voices on human rights, but sadly 
during 2016 we lost too many people 
who were willing to address interna-
tional as well as domestic rights. In 
New Caledonia, Jean-Pierre Deteix, 
a long-standing supporter of Kanak 
self-determination, was murdered in 
June. Kanak feminist Susanna Ounei, 
cofounder of the Groupe de femmes 
Kanak et exploitées en lutte (gfkel), 
died in New Zealand in September. 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi also died on 
29 September. A former vice president 
of Fiji, Madraiwiwi served as a jurist 
and human rights advocate across 
the region, as chief justice of Nauru, 
and with the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission in Solomon Islands 
(Madraiwiwi 2008). 
On Christmas Day, the Pacific 
Islands lost a leading scholar, religious 
leader, and antinuclear activist with 
the death of John Taroanui Doom in 
Tahiti. Fortunately, John’s memoirs 
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were published in October 2016. They 
document his regional and inter-
national ecumenical work through 
the Pacific Conference of Churches 
(pcc) and World Council of Churches 
(wcc), as well as his leadership of 
Moruroa e Tatou, the association 
of Maohi workers who staffed the 
French nuclear test sites (Doom 2016).
Pacific feminism had important 
advances, including the election in 
January of RMI President Hilda Heine 
as the first woman to lead an indepen-
dent island nation. In November, the 
University of the South Pacific hosted 
the inaugural Pacific Feminist Forum, 
which “acknowledged those who 
came before us, recognised our diversi-
ties, identified our challenges, cele-
brated our achievements, rearticulated 
a shared vision, shared strategies, built 
new and strengthened old alliances, 
and further defined our shared poli-
tics” (Pacific Feminist Forum 2016).
Human rights and the rule of law 
faced another tough year, with debate 
over the detention of opposition mem-
bers of Parliament in Fiji and Nauru 
and ongoing legal challenges following 
the 2015 jailing of fourteen members 
of Vanuatu’s Parliament for corrup-
tion. Researchers highlighted that 
organized crime in the Pacific is often 
a nexus between political elites and 
seemingly legal actors (Walton and 
Dinnen 2016).
The Nauru government under 
President Baron Waqa was returned 
to office in July, despite widespread 
international criticism of infringement 
of democratic rights and uncertainty 
over the futures of asylum seekers 
detained in two offshore processing 
centers. Justice Minister David Adeang 
condemned Australian media that 
he claimed “unethically attempted 
to influence our domestic politics by 
spreading lies, promoting Opposi-
tion mps and refusing to report the 
huge progress Nauru has made over 
the past three years under the Waqa 
 Government” (Government of the 
Republic of Nauru 2016).
Canberra’s leverage with Nauru is 
undercut by its reliance on the Waqa 
government to coordinate over refugee 
policy. Per capita, Nauru is the larg-
est recipient of Australian aid in the 
region, at an astonishing a$2,000 per 
person—more than ten times larger 
than any other Pacific Island coun-
try. In 2016, the Australian National 
Audit Office (anao) issued two scath-
ing reports on the Australian gov-
ernment’s management of contracts 
for the offshore processing centers 
in Nauru and Manus Island: “Sub-
stantial contract variations totaling 
over a$1 billion were made without 
a documented assessment of value for 
money” (anao 2016a, 83; see also 
anao 2016b).
Other commentators were more 
critical of Australia’s refugee policy, 
with one NZ Labour politician call-
ing for New Zealand to resettle the 
remaining refugees: “It’s almost like 
Australia has lost its moral compass 
in terms of where it’s going” (McIlroy 
2016). Human rights groups docu-
mented evidence that asylum seekers 
on Nauru and Manus have swallowed 
insect repellent, bashed their heads on 
walls, and doused their bodies with 
boiling water in a culture of self-harm. 
Cases include detainees swallowing 
poisons, stuffing tea bags down their 
throats, and hanging by bedsheets or 
other makeshift nooses (Amnesty Inter-
national/Human Rights Watch 2016).
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An internal review by Australia’s 
Immigration Department exonerated 
nine workers from Save the Children 
Australia (sca), who were deported 
from Nauru in October 2014 after 
being falsely accused of encouraging 
self-harm of detainees. Three reviews 
have now exonerated the sca staff, 
who have received a confidential 
financial settlement (Moss 2015; 
Doogan 2016; Ronalds 2016).
Australia’s offshore warehousing of 
asylum seekers and refugees was dealt 
a blow in April, when the full bench 
of the PNG Supreme Court ruled that 
detention on Manus breached the 
right to personal liberty in the PNG 
Constitution (PNG Supreme Court 
2016). With refugees being released 
into the general community on Manus, 
Australia and Papua New Guinea held 
closed-door discussions throughout 
the year trying to find a resettlement 
solution. 
Before the US elections, Australia 
had negotiated a refugee swap with 
the Obama administration, but the 
arrangement was criticized as a “dumb 
deal” by incoming President Trump in 
a testy phone call with Prime Minister 
Turnbull (Miller and Rucker 2017). 
The sharp insult to a long-standing 
ally is a sign of things to come.
Even though it is still the largest aid 
donor to the region, the Australian 
government has decreased its overseas 
aid to the lowest level in recent history, 
with another a$224 million cut from 
the Official Development Assistance 
(oda) budget in the 2016–17 Budget. 
This follows last year’s unprecedented 
cut of a$1 billion, which reduced the 
aid budget by 20 percent in one year 
(dfat 2016). Australia’s aid program 
is increasingly used to fund the private 
sector and economic diplomacy, with 
20 percent of aid in 2016 used for 
“aid for trade.” 
Australia and New Zealand have 
joined the World Bank to push for 
public financial management (pfm) 
reforms, but often based on models 
that do not suit smaller island govern-
ments. A World Bank report in Octo-
ber noted: “Case studies suggest that 
pfm reforms are sometimes predicated 
on intervention logics that do not hold 
in Pacific countries” (Haque 2016, vi).
For the anzus allies, strategic 
relations are complicated by increas-
ing Chinese economic and trade 
cooperation and the involvement 
of other “nontraditional” partners 
in the islands. The New Zealand 
Defence White Paper, released in June, 
 recognized that Forum Island coun-
tries are “seeking to broaden their 
potential support bases by forming 
links with countries beyond their 
existing traditional partners” (NZ 
Ministry of Defence 2016, 34).
The Defence White Paper promotes 
New Zealand’s maritime strategic 
interests in the South Pacific and the 
southern oceans, noting: “Given its 
strong connections with South Pacific 
countries, New Zealand has an endur-
ing interest in regional stability.” 
One of the principle roles for the NZ 
Defence Force is to “contribute to, 
and where necessary lead, operations 
in the South Pacific” (NZ Ministry of 
Defence 2016, 11).
After the primary interest of creat-
ing “a secure, resilient Australia,” 
Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper 
also notes: “Our second Strategic 
Defence Interest is in a secure nearer 
region. Australia cannot be secure if 
our immediate neighborhood includ-
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ing Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste 
and Pacific Island Countries becomes 
a source of threat to Australia. . . .
Australia will continue to seek to 
be the principal security partner for 
Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and 
Pacific Island Countries” (Australian 
Ministry of Defence 2016, 69, 74).
Western strategists are also seek-
ing to draw India into the Asia-Pacific 
region to assist with the containment 
of China. Australia and the United 
States are trying to extend security 
ties with India, including through the 
sale of uranium through the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, a potential breach 
of Australia’s commitments under the 
Rarotonga Treaty for a South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone (spnfz). 
Indian President Pranab Mukher-
jee visited New Zealand in late April 
and told a business lunch: “The 
Pacific Island countries are small but 
are doing their best to promote the 
 welfare of their people, apart from 
growing their economies. Poverty 
and poor quality education are two 
areas in which we would like to work 
closely with the respective govern-
ments and peoples” (Rahman 2016).
The visit by uss William P Law-
rence to Suva in February was the first 
by a US warship in a decade, while 
Special Forces from the United States 
and New Zealand cohosted a Pacific 
Area Security Sector Working Group 
meeting in Wellington in July. Guam, 
Hawai‘i, and other Pacific Islands will 
take on greater strategic importance 
as incoming President Trump pledges 
to build up the US Navy to its former 
glory.
Even as the navy deploys hard 
power, American soft power had 
its moment in 2016, as the Disney 
 Corporation unleashed the animated 
feature film Moana on screens across 
the world. Disney’s vision of a coura-
geous Polynesian girl exploring the 
Pacific, accompanied by the demi-
god Maui, was welcomed by critics 
as a delightful children’s movie but 
 critiqued by many Islanders for its 
plastic vision of Pacific culture (Diaz 
2016; Teaiwa 2016). 
nic maclellan
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